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The existence of multiple political parties is often established as a pre-condition of 
democratic governance. Political parties facilitate the formation of a consistent set of 
policies, reﬂ ecting certain values in governance, and draw together support to pursue such 
values among the electorate. 
 The American political system originally avoided creating political parties, since 
factions were negatively perceived as creating unnecessary division in the nation. The 
stance of James Madison against domestic factions in Federalist No. 10 (1787), however, 
had been turned around by the 1796 presidential election as the ﬁ rst division over 
federalism became a precursor to the current two-party system. 
 The American political parties have changed their faces over history, but the majority 
status between the existing two major parties has alternated almost regularly. An exception 
occurred during the Great Depression, which was followed by the Second World War. The 
New Deal coalition created a Democratic majority for nearly 40 years in the legislature, 
while the United States pursued its Cold War strategy on the world stage. Under such 
circumstances, bipartisanship in foreign policy-making was accepted as a necessity, 
although the division over domestic policies continued between the two major parties. 
 This aﬃ  nity toward bipartisanship was greatly challenged when national political 
support came to be evenly divided, creating a so-called 50-50 nation. This division ﬁ rst 
occurred with George W. Bush’s controversial victory in the presidential election of 2000 
and has continued sporadically until today. In the Senate, where a super majority status 
has become a necessary condition to avoid ﬁ libuster and progress legislation, gridlock 
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aﬀ ects policy-making more seriously than in the House of Representatives, which is 
mostly run by the majority leadership. In order to pursue certain policy developments, 
parties can either strategically gain a majority status by articulating the diﬀ erence to the 
voters, or seek to ﬁ nd bipartisan solutions to important issues on a case-by-case basis 
during the session. 
 The following section analyzes the combination of these two approaches observed 
interchangeably, focusing on the question of immigration reform in the recent 
congressional sessions. The challenge of achieving speciﬁ c policies is becoming more 
diﬃ  cult as the coming presidential contest unavoidably politicizes the question of 
undocumented immigrants, while politicians face articulated interests of an increasing 
number of American voters from minority groups in their districts. Washington political 
and research circles have been working on this challenge, faced with the deteriorating 
situation of minority population in the absence of legislation leading to any immigration 
reform. 
 While Congress has been dysfunctional and stopped oﬀ ering a practical solution, civil 
society organizations such as the Migration Policy Institute and Center for American 
Progress are presenting ideas as their research results (Abraham and Hamilton 2006, 
Rosenblum and Soto 2015, Wolgin 2015, Wong, Richter, Rodriguez and Wolgin 2015). 
Their activities are based on the statistical data which the Pew Research Center and 
Gallup are providing on the views held by the American public (Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, 
and Doherty 2014, Passel and Cohn 2015, Dugan 2015). Another resource of action is the 
Bipartisan Policy Center, founded in 2007, which aims to overcome the partisan divide 
quite typically observed in such questions as immigration reform (Graham, Prakken, 
Brown, and Zamora 2015, Roberts 2015). The following analysis makes use of the above-
mentioned research results and statistical data when necessary. 
I.  Dൾඅංൻൾඋൺඍංඈඇ ංඇ Dංඏංൽൾൽ Cඈඇ඀උൾඌඌൾඌ
1. Shifts in the National Political Scene
 The American political scene has historically undergone great changes when faced with 
challenges and opportunities. The New Deal Coalition is the most recent example of such 
change, and continued for more than half a century until the late 1980s. The Democratic 
Party maintained dominance by absorbing a wide spectrum of political powers, which 
were centered on the shared value of economic liberalism. Although there was an almost 
regular turnover of presidential parties during this time, Congress was constituted of the 
permanent majority, i.e., Democrats, and the permanent minority, i.e., Republicans, until 
the mid-1990s. Although a realignment of parties had been discussed since the late 1960s, 
a new dividing line replacing that of the New Deal did not clearly emerge for some time 
to come.
 Beneath what seemed to represent a permanent Democratic majority, however, was a 
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very subtle but steady attempt by the Republican side to create a national shift toward the 
right. Republican southern strategy started in the 1960s when Senator Barry Goldwater 
(R-Ariz.) failed in his presidential attempt, but successfully gathered the support of 
conservative Democrats in the South who had previously been believed to be against the 
party of Lincoln. In the following presidential election of 1968, Republican candidate 
Richard Nixon won 301 electoral votes against 191 of Democratic candidate Hubert 
Humphrey. In this election, though, George Wallace, originally a Democrat, formed a third 
party and won 46 electoral votes. The fact that he carried ﬁ ve Deep South states indicated 
their persisting dissatisfaction with the Republican. There was a brief Republican-majority 
Senate during the Ronald Reagan era, but the shift of the South to the Republican column 
had to wait until the 1990s, when Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) brought the majority status back 
to the Republican Party with “the Contract with America,” and the southern conservative 
Democrats oﬃ  cially crossed the party line. 
 Behind the upsurge of the Republican Party existed domestic as well as international 
challenges that reset the American domestic political scene. This was also the time when 
the Cold War came to an end, and the liberal guard supporting the weak from behind lost 
appeal among the general public. Meanwhile, stories of expanding the opportunities for 
entrepreneurship attracted more people, especially the youth, a trend that had had its 
precursor when President Ronald Reagan attacked welfare policies by depicting the 
infamous case of the “welfare mother.” Thus, young voters tended to support Republicans 
over Democrats as providers of a promising future. It was in such a context that Arkansas 
Governor Bill Clinton, who served as chair of the Democratic Leadership Council, shifted 
the Democratic message away from liberalism and the consequent big government. He 
tried to move the appeal of Democratic Party toward the third axis as a Presidential 
candidate, along with Tennessee Senator and his Vice Presidential candidate Al Gore, even 
though congressional Democrats maintained the party’s traditional stance.
 While President George H. W. Bush failed to use the economic message in his 
re-election campaign, Democratic candidate and then President Clinton focused directly on 
the economy and proposed the New Economy as an answer to the post-Cold War 
American society. Discussion of a market economy that moved away from government 
subsidies seems to have dominated the political scene, and a healthy American economy 
brought the current budget into the black, although it stopped short of cancelling out the 
accumulated federal deﬁ cit. In such a feel-good environment, the political center shifted to 
the right side of the previous center. Along with the Republican-majority Congress, 
President Clinton overhauled the welfare system, claiming that “Today, we are ending 
welfare as we know it” (Washington Post, August 23, 1996, A1). The real impact of this 
welfare reform took time to emerge as the national economy continued to remain upbeat 
for a while; however, some states had already begun cautious policy changes and cut 
welfare beneﬁ ts in time for an economic downturn. 
 While economic policies shifted to the right, social policies had diverse directions. 
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Those policies related to cost, such as welfare and immigration, showed a similar slide 
toward the right as the economic policies as shown above. In contrast, however, those 
related to identity politics veered toward the liberal direction. Women, racial minorities, 
and sexual minorities slowly expanded their political space, pushing the center of the 
Democratic Party back toward the left.
2. Thinning Partisan Overlaps
 The domestic and international developments of the late 20th century greatly changed 
the bases on which the two parties related with each other. For nearly half a century, the 
New Deal Coalition had been able to integrate political actors with diﬀ erent values using 
the power of its majority status. Although southern Democrats were suﬃ  ciently socially 
conservative to adopt a diﬀ erent stance from other Democrats and formed a Conservative 
Coalition with Republicans in their voting pattern, they continued to stand along with the 
Democratic Party during elections. This was because in the South, no Republican 
candidates had been able to win the congressional seat since the Civil War, even though 
Republican presidential candidates successfully carried the state. Also, before the 
globalization encircled the United States and southern economy turned more focused on 
high-technology, the South traditionally had been an agricultural area with its economic 
interest aligned with Democrats.
 When Congressman Gingrich gained the majority status for the Republican Party in 
the House in the 1994 elections, this historical pattern was greatly challenged. Without 
any fear of losing the majority status, southern conservatives were freed to change their 
partisan label and move closer to their ideological stance as Republican members. The loss 
of appeal of the Democrats to conservative southerners continued until the 2006 elections, 
when the Democrats’ own southern strategy, namely recruiting conservative enough 
candidates of their own in the South, returned some seats to the Democratic column. The 
addition of those who then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi called “majority makers” made the 
Democratic Party a majority, but the diversiﬁ cation of the party made it diﬃ  cult for its 
Source: Jones (2002).
Figure 1  Yearly Party Identiﬁ cation Average in Gallup Polls, 1988-2002
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leadership to pass legislation, especially those representing liberal values. Southern 
Democrats, on the other hand, were vulnerable to a more conservative attack from 
Republican challengers in their districts, only to be replaced in the election of 2010, which 
turned the House majority status back to the Republican side.
 On the surface, such frequent shifts of the majority status between the Democrats and 
Republicans represent a democratic political process, guaranteeing the opportunity for a 
competitive power shift between the two parties. Underneath the phenomenon, however, 
the ideological distribution of supporters between the two parties has fundamentally 
changed from that of the New Deal Coalition. As shown in Figure 2, the area of 
overlapping population of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats is gradually 
disappearing over time, and the distance between the median points of both parties is 
gradually widening, which means Democrats overall are more liberal than Republicans 
overall, and vice versa. 
 Such shifts are not occurring evenly in every electoral district, but rather have quite 
heavy regional differences. As the coastal areas on both oceans, incorporating 
metropolitan areas with an increasing minority population, become more liberal, internal 
rural areas inhabited by a predominantly white population tend to be more conservative. 
Thus, it is not just demography but also geography that is polarized, meaning that there 
are fewer and fewer opportunities for people to exchange views with diﬀ erent kinds of 
people, even within their neighborhood. Furthermore, it is becoming common for people 
to move to districts that match their ideologies, thus making those districts much purer in 
terms of ideological stance.
Source: Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, and Doherty (2014).
Figure 2  Republicans Shift to the Right, Democrats to the Left: Distribution of 
Republicans and Democrats on a 10-item scale of political value
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 This increasing polarization among the constituency is naturally reﬂ ected by 
congressional members, especially in the House where districts tend to be smaller and 
monolithic compared with the state-wide Senate. Supported by the opinions of a polarized 
constituency, elected oﬃ  cials perceive it as not politically beneﬁ cial to make a deal with a 
diﬀ erent position, but instead leave the diﬀ erence as it is, saying, “It’s my way or the high 
way.” 
 While voters were increasingly divided in their party identiﬁ cation, the composition of 
the Congress till the late 20th century had continued to show some overlaps, especially 
reﬂ ecting the regional diﬀ erences in party support. The eastern Republicans were 
economically conservative, but culturally liberal in nature. On the other hand, southern 
Democrats supported liberal economic policy, while uniting with the Republicans over 
social issues, especially racial issues. Such regional diﬀ erences in the aggregate produced 
ideological overlaps, and members of both parties around the median were more often 
than not able to ﬁ nd solutions to ideologically divided issues. 
 However, the new political landscape of the late 20th to 21st century, as stated above, 
is characterized by dual bipolarization, one of constituency/members’ ideological 
distribution, and the other of geographical distribution. Thus, Congress increasingly suﬀ ers 
from gridlock, and regular policy-making has become less and less possible. Furthermore, 
the traditionally less partisan and more deliberative Senate has also fallen victim to 
partisanship, and made the leadership responsibility diﬃ  cult to pursue.
 Under such circumstances, a totally new attempt for bipartisanship emerged, not of a 
top-down nature but among the rank-and-ﬁ le members, the so-called “Gang of X” 
phenomenon.
II.  Cൺඌൾඌ ඈൿ Bංඉൺඋඍංඌൺඇඌඁංඉ
1. Attempts for Bipartisanship
 Given the constant polarization between the two parties, if neither party maintains a 
solid majority, it is diﬃ  cult for that party to pass any legislation by itself. This situation is 
critical when appropriation bills or executive or judicial conﬁ rmations are held up for a 
long time due to partisan politics. In 1994, for example, the Republican House took the 
budget hostage and the federal government had to face a temporal shut down. While 
confrontation over important bills can take place in both houses, the House business is 
mostly run by the rule of simple majority and its leadership is equipped with a greater 
power to gather the necessary votes to move on. On the other hand, the principle of 
Senate business is to prevent a majoritarian runaway and thus individual members have 
more power to stop the legislation. Based on such diﬀ erences, while the House has tended 
to represent partisan politics, the Senate has tended to represent bipartisan politics. 
 With the recent increase in polarization, this characterization of the Senate has also 
shifted and traditional practices of the Senate which are originally intended to protect the 
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minority voice are now often used to block the bipartisan consensus. Especially so is the 
use, or threat of use, of ﬁ libuster, which requires 60 votes to invoke cloture under Senate 
Rule XXII, a super majority rather than simple majority. The most recent example of 
ﬁ libuster was by Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) who held the ﬂ oor for nearly 13 hours in 2013 
and for over 10 and a half hours in 2015.
 Although 60 votes can place a cloture on ﬁ libuster, each senator is able to speak for 
no more than one hour for a total of no more than 30 hours after that, which thereby turns 
into a practical delay of the legislative procedure. When the Democratic majority lost the 
60-seat status (including independents) due to the passing away of Sen. Ted Kennedy and 
the Massachusetts seat was then won by a Republican, they chose to use a super-majority 
vote of 60 from the outset to bypass the cloture threat against the Republicans. In 
November 2013, the Democratic majority of the Senate, frustrated by the repeated 
attempts of Republican members to slow down legislative activities, decided to eliminate 
the use of the ﬁ libuster on executive branch nominees and judicial nominees below the 
Supreme Court. This attempt was called the “nuclear option,” and invited strong criticism 
from the minority party, though a few Republican senators joined the Democrats and 
supported the change. Interestingly, however, even as the majority shifted to the 
Republican side in 2015, the nuclear option so-much criticized by the Republicans 
remained in the hands of the Senate leadership.
 Even before the current gridlock became a serious problem and the need for a way out 
started to be discussed, there were attempts to form a bipartisan voice in order to resolve 
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate (2015).
Figure 3  Senate Action on Cloture Motions
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diﬃ  cult questions that challenged the nation. For example, when President Reagan’s 
Central American policy invited strong opposition from the Democrats, the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central America was formed by Executive Order 12433 in 
1983 to investigate the nature of American interests in the region, as well as the threats 
posed to those interests. The Commission members, not more than 12, were to “be drawn 
from among distinguished leaders of the government, business, labor, and education, 
Hispanic and religious communities. No more than seven members shall be of the same 
political party” (Executive Order 12433, Section 1).
 Similar executive attempts to ﬁ nd bipartisan solutions can be cited as follows: 1983 
State Tax and Related Fiscal Policy, 1990 Comprehensive Health Care, 1995 Entitlement 
and Tax Reform, and 2002 Millennial Housing Commission. It is not only the executive 
branch that searched for bipartisan solutions, but Congress also attempted to present 
bipartisan solutions in the following cases: Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act of 1994, 
Bipartisan Social Security Reform Act of 1999/2000, Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act of 2002, and Bipartisan Committee Hurricane Katrina.
 Bipartisanship is generally sought for when the majority party does not hold a 
suﬃ  cient edge to carry the legislation, and needs to gain support from the other side of 
the aisle. From the political viewpoint, however, the minority party gains more by 
opposing the agenda of the majority in such cases than compromising its position. From 
the policy viewpoint, though, this political game fails to beneﬁ t any of the constituencies, 
and bipartisan attempts are required to break through the gridlock. One of the best 
examples was the crisis management that occurred in the post-September 11 period.
2. Post-September 11 Bandwagon
 The election of President George W. Bush in 2000 symbolized the divided America 
when the ﬁ nal result was decided by the Supreme Court, rather than by the ballot box, to 
be granted to those with less of the popular vote, 50,456,002 for Bush vs. 50,999,897 for 
Gore (Federal Election Commissions 2001). G. W. Bush was supposed to be a uniting 
rather than a dividing president based on his moderate governorship in Texas. However, a 
very contentious electoral development involving a re-count in Florida and the ﬁ nal 
Supreme Court decision instead set the tone of partisanship. The 107th Congress also 
represented the divided political situation of the United States, with the Senate becoming 
evenly divided with the switching of Vermont Senator Jim Jeﬀ ords from Republican to 
Independent and his caucusing with the Democrats. A so-called “50-50 America” set the 
tone for the Bush administration until the day before September 11, 2001.
 The attack of September 11 dramatically changed the atmosphere of American politics. 
Congressional members, who had been involved in heated ﬁ ghts over numerous policy 
questions until the moment before, suddenly came to express that they were all Americans 
standing behind their President. In this strange psychological situation, preparation for a 
war advanced in American politics. Furthermore, any critical voice against this political 
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bandwagon was cried down as unpatriotic, and civil liberty, which was deemed more 
important in times of crisis than in ordinary times, was compromised, partly voluntarily 
and partly through legislation to concentrate power on government, such as the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, PL107-56).
 It took some time before a checking function over the government returned to 
American society, and during that time, the viability of American democracy was severely 
challenged. The ﬁ rst challenge was how to stand against the deprivation of human rights 
of the weakest in society, namely Muslim minorities. Caught between American values on 
human rights and the imminent fear of violent attack, governmental decisions as well as 
civil society reactions often ended up placing an imbalanced burden on minorities. 
 The treatment of so-called “terrorists” caught during the War on Terror presented 
another challenge to American liberal democracy. If those foreign nationals were regarded 
as “soldiers” in a war, their rights as enemy combatants must be protected under 
international law. The Bush administration which deﬁ ned its reaction as a “war,” however, 
did not regard them as soldiers but terrorists without the right to be protected, and placed 
those caught during the ﬁ ght in a camp outside of the United States in Guantanamo. 
Another infamous case of human rights violation took place in Iraq, when American 
soldiers disgraced enemy soldiers, or terrorists, particularly in contravention of their 
Islamic religious values. 
 It was only in 2005, however, when a New York Times article revealed that the Bush 
administration had been unlawfully gathering the personal information of Americans via 
unwarranted wiretapping, that the American public at large started to understand that their 
own civil liberty, not just those of the enemy soldiers, was in fact at risk. The National 
Security Agency’s Edward Snowden later revealed the degree to which human rights 
violation could pass in the name of national security and how Congress, which was set to 
watch the executive branch’s excesses, ﬁ rst failed to do so and then failed to overcome the 
partisan divide to rectify the wrong.
 During such a harsh partisan divide, however, there were attempts at bipartisan 
solutions to the imminent problems faced by the nation, among which was immigration 
reform. The last legislation on immigration policy had been made during the Clinton 
administration, but the imminent question of undocumented immigrants remained 
untouched. The G. W. Bush administration’s attempt to reach an agreement with Mexico 
over undocumented entries was suspended by the tragedy of September 11. Repeated 
attempts by Congress, especially the Senate, followed but failed to produce any 
legislation. In the following section, let us examine how bipartisan eﬀ orts on immigration 
reform repeatedly failed, and what we can learn about the limits and possibilities of the 
bipartisan approach.
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III.  Cඁൺඅඅൾඇ඀ൾඌ ඈൿ Pඈඅංඍංർඌ ඈඏൾඋ Pඈඅංർංൾඌ
1. Trials of Immigration Reform
 Whenever an immigration law was changed, the ceiling was moved upward and the 
number of immigrants actually entering the United States increased, from the level of 
1965 to that of 1986, to that of 1990, and ﬁ nally to that of 1996. More important than the 
number of immigrants admitted to the United States legally is those entering illegally. 
Some of these, who either failed to meet the conditions or remained outside the annual 
ceiling but still required the economic opportunity of the United States, somehow crossed 
the border or overstayed their visa. It has been pointed out that the 1965 immigration 
reform, which started to place a ceiling on immigrants from the Western Hemisphere as 
well, was not equipped with the measures necessary to control such unexpected entries/
overstays. 
 The immigration reform of the Reagan era, the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(PL 99–603, 1986), was the ﬁ rst attempt to deal with the unexpected stock of 
undocumented immigrants. By providing amnesty to those who had entered the United 
States before January 1, 1982, this measure could legalize and absorb many of the 
existing undocumented population. Those who had entered between 1982 and 1986, 
however, were excluded from this newly established amnesty, while the much stricter 
border control discouraged them from moving back to Mexico. Moreover, the possibility 
of legalization after entry, which this law unintendedly indicated to potential immigrants, 
functioned to invite an increased undocumented population, despite more restrictions 
being placed on the undocumented in terms of work and welfare opportunities. 
 The following Bush administration responded to the situation caused as the byproduct 
of the Reagan reform. The Immigration Act 1990 (PL 101–649) increased the ceiling of 
immigration from 500,000 to 700,000, introduced a diversity program, and provided a slot 
for unskilled laborers. Further reform was to be conducted by the Clinton administration, 
but the elections of 1994 handed the House majority to the Republicans. Along with the 
Anti-Terrorism Act and the Welfare Reform Act, President Clinton worked toward the 
passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA, PL 
104–208, 1996), all of which worked against the fate of undocumented immigrants as well 
as prospected immigrants. The Republican Party claimed that the passage of these acts 
was their legislative victory as a majority party, while President Clinton claimed that 
Democratic eﬀ orts in legislative process secured the Democrat’s value in these acts. 
Between the partisan ﬁ ght over the stricter immigration policies, a constructive approach 
to the existing undocumented immigrants failed to be addressed.
 Entering the oﬃ  ce with Republican majorities both in the House and the Senate, 
President G. W. Bush was expected to streamline the ﬂ ow of immigrants from Mexico, 
backed by his experience as Texas Governor. While responses to the September 11 
incident had held up the announcement of the President’s new immigration policy, it was 
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the Senate that proceeded with the immigration reform, under the Secure America and 
Orderly Immigration Act (S. 1033) introduced by Sens. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and John 
McCain (R-Ariz.) in 2005. Another attempt was made by Senator Arlen Spector (D-Penn.) 
with the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), cosponsored by Sens. 
Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), Mel Martinez (R-Fla.), McCain, Kennedy, Lindsey Graham (R-S.
C.), and Sam Brownback (R-Kansas), which successfully passed the Senate but failed to 
proceed through the House.
 Immigration reform eﬀ orts were again attempted in the Senate the following year by 
the minority leader Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) under the Secure Borders, Economic 
Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348), co-sponsored by Sens. 
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Kennedy, Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), and Ken Salazar (D-Colo.). 
This bill was supported by the so-called “Gang of 12,” consisting of bipartisan senators 
including Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.), Mel Martinez (R-Fla.), Salazar, and Specter as the 
driving force behind the legislative process.
 This bill also contained, as one part, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors (DREAM) Act with the following four basic eligibility requirements: entry before 
the age of 16, high school graduation or possession of a GED, good moral character, and 
at least ﬁ ve years of continuous presence in the United States. This part, namely the 
DREAM Act, which was never legislated, would later be implemented under the executive 
action by President Obama when Congress repeatedly failed to produce a positive 
legislation.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1850–2000 Decennial Census; 2010 American 
Community Survey.
Figure 4 Foreign-Born Population and as a Percentage of Total Population
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 Following the failed attempts under the G. W. Bush administration, President Obama 
with the Democratic majority in both houses, had set immigration reform as priorities of 
his administration. The Hispanic organizations and voters were enthusiastically supporting 
the President, believing that their electoral contribution to his victory deserved the 
legislative product. It was, however, not the only priority but among the top priorities, 
coming after health care reform. President Obama pushed through the health care reform, 
against both the Republican opposition and opposition on the state level. Utilizing all the 
political capital, President Obama was able to achieve health care reform, the Aﬀ ordable 
Care Act (or ObamaCare), but the congressional Democrats who supported the President 
suﬀ ered from election losses in 2010, and the majority of the House shifted to the 
Republican side only four years after the Democrats had gained it. 
 This turn-over was not just about the balance among the two parties, but accompanied 
a more serious aspect. It was immediately after the Obama administration commenced, 
and a collection of conservative movements, the “Tea Party,” was launched at a local 
level, based on the protest against the liberal stance of President Obama which prevailed 
through his presidential campaign. Each local group was relatively independent, but in a 
combined way, the Tea Party challenged not only the Democrats, but also the moderate 
Republican stance from the inside. The Republican Party, thus, gained the majority in the 
House, but its leadership was constantly challenged by this movement. 
 With the Democrats’ loss of the majority in the House, and the Tea Party’s challenge 
within the House Republicans, the prospect for any congressional actions on immigration 
reform was quite unexpected. As the challenge for his re-election was approaching, 
President Obama proceeded to declare an executive action, Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), on June 15, 2012 in order to immediately extend opportunities to 
undocumented youth who were brought to the United States as children. As DACA 
application process started in the following August, congressional Republicans criticized 
President Obama for ignoring the legislature and launching an extra-legal policy on his 
own. Concerns were also held among the Latino/as over the possible consequence of 
coming out as undocumented aliens, should President Obama be replaced with a 
Republican president in the fall elections. 
 Despite the Republican criticism and despite such early concerns among the Latino/as, 
though, an increasing number of undocumented youth came forward and obtained the 
temporary secure status in the American society after Obama’s re-election. By July 20, 
2014, 55 percent of DACA’s immediately eligible youth had applied, and most of them 
have been approved their status (Batalova, Hooker, and Capps with Bachmeier 2014, 9). 
DACA, however, could not be a permanent measure, and President Obama understood that 
it had to be followed by a legislated measure under the immigration reform. 
2. Case of 2013 Reform and Mutual Blame
 The next trial for immigration reform took place in the Senate in 2013, immediately 
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after Obama’s second term commenced. This time, the immigration reform bill was 
moved forward in a bipartisan way, with the help of the so-called “Gang of Eight” from 
the Republican side. These Republican senators, just like the previous attempts by Sens. 
Kennedy and McCain in 2007, extended their support to the Democratic leadership so as 
to form the necessary absolute majority and pass the legislation. The “Gang of Eight” was 
constituted of Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.), Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.), Jeﬀ rey Chiesa (R-N.J.), 
Susan Collins (R-Maine), Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), Jeﬀ  Flake (R-Ariz.), Graham, Dean 
Heller (R-Nev.), John Hoeven (R-N.D.), Angus King (I-Maine), Mark Kirk (R-Ill.), 
McCain, Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.). 
 The eight senators represented each of their local as well as ideological interests as in 
the case of Sen. Rubio, himself Latino, who is a leading voice of the Latino constituency 
among the Republicans. Sens. Flake and McCain, representing the bordering state of 
Arizona, or those with many Latino/a workers inside of their states, such as Sens. 
Alexander and Corker of Tennessee or Sen. Graham of South Carolina, joined the 
movement from a very realistic standpoint. More importantly, just as the previous attempt 
had been made by Sens. Kennedy and McCain, it was made on the side of the Senate, 
which can obtain a compromise, rather than the House where the members represent 
smaller and more homogeneous districts. This is more so because of the recent 
re-districting strategy, which concentrates certain populations to produce secure electoral 
outcomes for the party in power.
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 
2013 (S744) passed through the Senate by bipartisan majority of 68 (D 54, R 14) - 32 (D 
0, R 32), but with strong opposition from within the Republican Party. Following its 
passage through the Senate, the House Republican leadership was asked to match the bill, 
Source: Batalova, Hooker, and Capps with Bachmeier (2014, 9).
Figure 5  DACA First-time Applications Accepted for Processing, Approved and Denied
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and thus ﬁ nally create legislation after a very long period of its absence. However, the 
House Republicans, despite being in the majority, were not monolithic but rather seated on 
a fragile balance among themselves. Pressed by such anti-immigration forces from within 
its membership, the House leadership decided not to follow through the Senate-passed 
version but to proceed with its own version of immigration reform; thus, the prospect of 
passing any immigration law in the 113rd Congress faded out of view. 
 While the Obama administration toughened border control, and deported more 
undocumented aliens than the G. W. Bush administration, thus inviting criticism from 
liberals, the anti-immigration group continued to blame Obama for being soft on illegal 
conduct of these trespassers. In fact, the inﬂ ow of undocumented immigrants from Mexico 
decreased due to the economic upturn of the country, not just due to the border control 
(See Figure 6). The Southwest Border, however, began to face a new challenge of 
unaccompanied child migrants brought from the southern Latin American countries. Some 
blame this on the fact that the Obama administration extended legal status to 
undocumented immigrants who entered the United States as children, which extended an 
unreasonable expectation that once these children could cross the border, they would be 
given legal rights in the United States.
 Despite such criticism, President Obama announced on November 20, 2014 an 
executive action that would further expand the range of DACA to include anyone who 
entered the United States as a child before January 1, 2010, without regard to his/her 
current age. He also announced a new program, namely DAPA (Deferred Action for 
Source: Seghetti and Durak (2014, 1).
Figure 6  Apprehensions of Unauthorized Migrants by U.S. Border Patrol 
along the U.S. Southwest Border, 2000-2013
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Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents), which would give temporary 
relief from deportation to parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents (LPRs) 
who have lived in the United States for ﬁ ve years or longer.  
 In addition to Republican criticisms, more than half of the states, or 26 states, legally 
challenged Obama’s executive action immediately and sued the Department of Justice, 
aiming to block the new program of DAPA as well as to prevent the expansion of DACA. 
In the State of Texas et al v. United States of America case, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin joined Texas and 
challenged the program of the Obama administration. In February 2015, Texas District 
Court blocked the expansion of DACA and implementation of DAPA, and the judgement 
of the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals is pending as of this writing, while the targeted 
undocumented immigrants have been kept from obtaining the beneﬁ t.
 Behind such an unproductive action/reaction process between the executive branch and 
Congress involving the legal challenge from the state level, however, there were some real 
changes in the voices of the American public that supported immigration reform. On the 
immigration issue, the general public increasingly hopes to ﬁ nd a solution not a 
punishment. Figures 7 and 8 show that the American public was not originally opposed to 
immigration, although September 11 aﬀ ected the general feeling, but that more people 
continued to support immigration than opposed it immediately after September 11. There 
is a connection between how people evaluate the impact of immigration and how much 
they expect the government to control the extent of it.
 Table 1 below shows an interesting ﬁ nding on the generational trend of ideological 
self-identiﬁ cation. It was long believed that Baby Boomers, who spent their immediate 
adulthood during the time of the Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War 
movement, tend to be more liberal than other generations. However, the ﬁ gures shown in 
Source: Dugan (2015). 
Figure 7  U.S. Adults’ Assessments of Immigration’s Overall Impact on the U.S.
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Table 1 indicate that the younger generations of Americans are more liberal than the older 
cohorts. This trend also applies to Generation X, who came of age at a time of economic 
conservatism. 
 Such generational shifts also reﬂ ect that an increasing ratio of the younger generation 
is of a minority population. As legalized immigrants move on the path to citizenship, they 
earn rights to vote, and as more Latino/as are born on American soil, they have voting 
rights from the beginning of their lives. Upcoming debates over the immigration reform 
cannot but reﬂ ect such increasing presence of Latino/a voters.
Table 1  Ideological Self-Identiﬁ cation, by Generation, 2014
Generation (Birth years) Conservative Moderate Liberal
Conservative-
Liberal gap
% % % pct. pts.
Millennials (1980-1996) 28 40 30 -2
Generation X (1965-1979) 35 39 23 +12
Baby boomers (1946-1964) 44 33 21 +23
Traditionalists (1900-1945) 48 33 17 +31
All adults 38 36 24 +14
GALLUP
Source: Jones (2015a).
Source: Dugan (2015).
Figure 8  U.S. Adults’ Preferences on U.S. Immigration Levels
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Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇ
As we have observed above, bipartisanship is not a natural phenomenon but rather is 
constructed with political aims. Those aims must be shared by the leadership of both 
parties, as well as by both houses in order to gain a result from their eﬀ orts.
 In January 2015, nine conservative House Republicans formed a new group, the 
“Freedom Caucus,” separate from the existing conservative group, the Republican Study 
Committee (RSC). The original nine were said to be Reps. Scott Garrett (R-N.J.), Jim 
Jordan (R-Ohio), John Fleming (R-La.), Matt Salmon (R-Ariz.), Justin Amash (R-Mich.), 
Raúl Labrador (R-Idaho), Mick Mulvaney (R-S.C.), Ron DeSantis (R-Fla.), and Mark 
Meadows (R-N.C.). It is reported that Rep. Mulvaney, who lost in the selection of the 
RSC chair, formed a separate, more conservative group to ﬁ ght against the Republican 
leadership (Marcos 2015). Although its membership was not openly announced, a self-
claimed 29 members had reportedly joined the Caucus by summer (Fuller 2015). 
 A day after Pope Francis made an address to the joint session of Congress on 
September 24, 2015, Speaker John Boehner suddenly announced his resignation as of the 
end of October 2015. Although two Freedom Caucus members departed the group due to 
its straying away from policy-focused activities toward internal political ﬁ ghts, a 
substantial number of the Caucus’ membership still continues to unsettle the direction of 
the House as of this writing. Further complicating the situation is that the Majority Leader 
Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), who was to succeed Speaker Boehner in the coming election, 
had withdrawn from the race just three weeks before the election.**
 Policy-making based on bipartisanship can only work when the middle ground holds, 
and the current Congress obviously lacks such a middle ground. On the side of the 
Republican Party, a far right Freedom Caucus is attacking the leadership for its approach 
to the moderate stance, while the liberal wing of the Democrats continues to adhere to 
their ideological purity, which is too liberal to be acceptable by the Republicans. With 
weak leadership in the majority party, there is little chance of creating a meeting place 
between the parties for some time to come. 
 A pressing domestic phenomenon or an international situation may be the factor that 
brings together the two extremes, or developments during the next presidential elections 
may lead to a new meeting ground. Policy and politics are intrinsically connected, and 
such an impasse in policy-making makes us question how the preceding stage of 
democratic selection of politicians should be contemplated. Bipartisanship is not an easy 
＊＊ Wisconsin Republican Paul Ryan, the Vice Presidential candidate in the elections of 2012, was elected as 
Speaker on October 29 with 236 votes, against Rep. Pelosi with 184 votes and Rep. Daniel Webster (R-Fla.) 
with 7 votes (Congressional Record 10/29/2015, H7337-38). In the preceding Republican Conference on 
October 28, 2015, Rep. Ryan received 200 votes (one vote from a delegate) against 43 votes of Rep. Webster 
(Politico 10/28/2015), showing continuing challenges possibly raised within the Republican Party by the 
Freedom Caucus.
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solution but a challenging task under the constantly divided American politics. This 
challenge extends to the voters themselves who exercise the critical role of selecting their 
representatives. 
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